Lords Against the War

Baroness Williams of Crosby - LD

The Lord Bishop of Oxford

Lord Howe of Aberavon - C

Lord Thomson of Monifieth - LD

Lord Bruce of Donington - L

Lord Gilmour of Craigmillar - C

Lord Goodhart - LD

Lord Wright of Richmond – X Bench

Lord Brennan - L

The Earl of Sandwich – X Bench

Baroness Uddin - L

The Lord Bishop of Guilford

Lord Judd - L

Lord Redesdale - LD

Lord Rea - L

Lord Alderdice - LD

Lord Morgan - L

Lord Chan – X Bench

The Lord Bishop of Salisbury

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer - LD

Lord Skidelsky - XB

Baroness Turner of Camden - L

Lord Stoddart of Swindon - O

Lord Phillips of Sudbury - LD

Baroness Massey of Darwen - L

Lord Greaves - LD

Lord Wallace of Saltaire - LD

5.2 p.m.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, I ask the indulgence of the House with regard to its rules. Owing to the unfortunate fact that I am more than 90 years of age and consequently find it difficult for medical reasons to be up much after normal dinner time, I must ask your Lordships' indulgence in this respect. I shall not be able to be here at the end of the debate—after, no doubt, some distinguished speeches. I hope that the House will extend its generosity to me if I disobey that rule on this one occasion.
I do not believe in war. I do not believe in war because it is one of the most immoral acts that organised or semi-organised society can perpetrate. We talk of collateral damage in the event of any war. I wonder whether we understand what is really meant by collateral damage. In the case of the people of Iraq, it means that in addition to whatever disabilities they may face now—I should not want to minimise them—they will be blown up and torn apart, men, women and children who have never played any part in even mildly inconveniencing our life here.
It is more than 50 years ago since, as a serving officer in Her Majesty's Army during the war—I was a member of the Territorial Army even before that—I was asked to go before the North Portsmouth Labour Party, which was looking for a candidate at the time. When they invited me, party members knew perfectly well my military record at the time—risible and uninteresting though it may be. So I went to see them. It was probably an unwinnable seat, but I eventually won it. Praise be to luck; praise be to my good luck.
But one thing that my party in Portsmouth impressed on me was that one of the cardinal tenets, one of the built-in beliefs, of my party was the wickedness of war. My party said that it quite understood that I had been involved in both the TA and in the then current conflict but, for the future, my party through to its core did not

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believe in war; it believed passionately in peace. It secured my agreement to obey that edict. Thus I have tried ever since.
I very much regret the way in which the current argument has occasionally been conducted. It has not always been conducted in public. Where it has been aired in public, it has not always been other than rather loose with the truth. I have abundant examples of that, which only the constraints of time permit me to ignore.
War is an evil thing. It is not something to be brushed over or set aside. It is not something to be borne and tolerated in the back of one's mind on the basis of some probability occurring in future. It is a terrible thing and has terrible consequences for the individuals concerned. If we go to war—if we were unwise enough to go to war—we should be doing rather more than that. We should be implicitly harming the whole political structure of the world—a political structure based in the main on the sovereignty of individual states to arrive at their own decisions, to consult their own people and, through the United Nations, to express their collective view.
What would happen in the event of our opening hostilities with the rest of the world—because that is what it would be? We would be destroying its civil structure. Instead, we would be substituting—for perfectly good, sincere reasons—the power and authority of one state, the United States, which, thereafter, would in effect conduct the affairs of mankind in general.
One may find that difficult to realise, until one comes to consider one small matter—it is very small, but illustrative. It concerns the European Community, in which I have a more than passing interest. One of the reasons why Turkey has, so far, been denied membership of the European Community is, ironically, its record in dealing with the Kurds. It is small things like that—there are many more like them—that go to illustrate that, if we go to war in support of our colleagues in the United States, we shall do rather more than achieve a bloody victory; we shall achieve a transformation in the way that the affairs of the world outside the United Kingdom and America are conducted.

5.10 p.m.
Lord Gilmour of Craigmillar: My Lords, if the war starts in March, as seems almost certain, it will be, in my view, a war of cynicism, aggression, greed and unpopularity. In Glasgow, the Prime Minister claimed that unpopularity was the price of leadership; in fact, Mr Blair has been unpopular not because he has been leading but because he has been following President Bush. His unpopularity is the price not of leadership but of "followership".
During the past century, the United States was, undoubtedly, a considerable force for good. However, it would be difficult to argue that the current Administration in Washington are a force for good. That is why they are so generally unpopular in much of the world. Their arrogant bullying; their opposition to

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measures to improve the environment and to arms control, as outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby; their attitude to the international court; their meanness over foreign aid; and their economic policy—free trade for everybody else but subsidies and tariffs for themselves—which damages the economy of many poor countries, make it difficult to argue that they are a force for good. Yet, it is that most benighted American Administration for many years—probably over a century—that this country has followed so slavishly. That is what causes the Government's unpopularity.
It will be a cynical war because the reasons given for it are largely bogus. The idea that Saddam Hussein—odious though he be—presents an imminent threat to this country or the United States is deeply implausible. In an article in the New York Times entitled "Bush should start telling the truth about this war", the pro-war, pro-Israeli right-wing American columnist Thomas Friedman admitted that Saddam,
"does not threaten America. He can be deterred".
Friedman added:

"It is a war of choice".
That is plainly true. It is certainly not a war of necessity, still less a just war.
Another reason given for the war—the alleged connection between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden—is even more bogus. There is no evidence for it.
The third reason given is that Saddam defies UN resolutions. That will not wash either: Israel also defies UN resolutions. Instead of being bombed by the Americans, however, Israel is showered with weapons and dollars for its defiance. In her interesting speech, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, sought to differentiate between Israel and Iraq, but there are many other UN resolutions concerning Israel besides Nos. 242 and 338. Unlike Iraq, Israel occupies territory and rules people in Syria and Palestine with no conceivable right to do so. Israel also wages a vicious colonial war against the Palestinians, who are struggling to free themselves from a brutal occupation. Yet, the Bush Administration give the Israeli Government unconditional support and allow Sharon to go on building illegal Jewish settlements in contravention of United Nations Resolution 465, as well as international law. Thus continues Sharon's robbery with violence of the small amount of land still left to the Palestinians.
If our Prime Minister had made his support of the United States over Iraq conditional on serious action—rather than inaction—from Bush to settle the Palestinian issue on the basis of UN resolutions, he would, at least, have been consistent and just, unlike the president. Unfortunately, he has done nothing of the sort.
The fourth reason—that there is a moral case for war because of the undoubtedly bestial nature of the Iraqi regime—was produced by the Prime Minister in some desperation, after his other reasons were shown to be unconvincing. As Harold Macmillan said, morals are best left to the archbishops; we all know what the

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archbishops—and the Pope—think about war in Iraq. In consequence, many fewer people than before believe what the Prime Minister says. In the late 1940s, there was a saying about President Truman that ran:

"Washington could not tell a lie; Roosevelt could not tell the truth; Truman does not know the difference".
That is increasingly applicable to the Prime Minister. He says that we are making a final push for peace, when, clearly, we are making a final push for war.
It will be a war of aggression. As many noble Lords have said, Saddam—horrendous though he is—has done nothing recently to merit being attacked. The principal warmongers in America are called "chicken-hawks". Bush, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle and company were not brave enough to risk their own lives fighting in Vietnam, but they are plenty brave enough to risk other people's lives attacking Iraq. Aggression against Iraq takes attention away from America's flagging economy and the failure to find bin Laden. They also want Iraq's oil, which is where the greed comes in, and they aim to establish US-Israeli imperial hegemony throughout the Middle East. My noble and learned friend Lord Howe of Aberavon touched briefly on that.
Probably—far from certainly—the Iraqis will crumble, not fight. Probably, America, through persuasion of various sorts, will get a UN resolution. That will mean that the president and the Prime Minister will get away with their aggression for the time being. But, as many noble Lords have said, Heaven knows what will happen after that. As the fine Israeli writer Amos Oz has said, the dangers of the war are immense, and, as others have pointed out, what has happened in Afghanistan is not very encouraging.
The only sure result of the aggression will be even greater hatred of the United States and the recruitment of more terrorists. The eventual victims of those terrorists will be innocent, but the president will be guilty.

5.18 p.m
Lord Goodhart: My Lords, as a lawyer, I shall speak about the Iraq crisis in the context of international law. I do so as someone who is British and American by birth and has strong links to both countries.
I shall start from a basic principle: there should be an international rule of law that governs the external actions of states in the same way that, as we now accept, the rule of law must govern the conduct of the state in the internal exercise of its powers. In that context, it is a matter of great concern that, in some respects, the USA—the present Administration, at least—rejects that principle, which it sees as a limitation on its powers. That is true of, at least, some of the aspects of the handling of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, and it is true of the American attitude to the International Criminal Court, which has been not just a refusal to co-operate but a policy of active obstruction.
International law is more amorphous and uncertain than domestic law. It has something equivalent to statute law, with the Charter of the United Nations and the numerous covenants, conventions and treaties made since the end of the Second World War.

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However, those are not exhaustive sources of international law. International law develops outside the treaty system, as well as within it. There is only a rudimentary court system. There is the International Court of Justice, but it has limited jurisdiction. We now have the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals on Rwanda and former Yugoslavia.
Finally, there is of course no central agency for law enforcement. We must rely on the willingness of states to contribute their own forces and logistics support to enforcement actions.
If we are to support action against Iraq we must be satisfied that that action is within the rule of law and not outside it. There are three possible legal justifications for military intervention in Iraq: first, the right of humanitarian intervention; secondly, self-defence; and, thirdly, the failure to comply with the United Nations resolutions. There has been confusion between these three justifications, which has at times been shared by our own Government.
Let us look first at humanitarian intervention. This is a new principle which has arisen outside the charter. It was most clearly recognised in Kosovo. It is widely, but not universally, accepted by international lawyers. In cases such as genocide by rulers against their own people, as in Rwanda and Cambodia, it is hard to deny that such a principle exists.
Can it apply to Iraq? Can we invade Iraq to save its own people from tyranny? Saddam Hussein is certainly a murderous tyrant. He has killed thousands of his opponents and he has caused many thousands of deaths among Iraqis by the way he has spent money on arms and palaces which he was supposed to spend on food and medicines. But the right of humanitarian intervention is an exceptional power and can be used only in exceptional circumstances such as genocide or major ethnic cleansing. The closest Saddam has come to this is in his treatment of the Marsh Arabs, whose culture he has destroyed and many of whose people he has killed. But it would be unrealistic to treat even that as a justification for war. I do not believe that we are entitled to go to war with Iraq to save the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein, desirable as that result would be.
As regards self-defence, individual and collective rights of self-defence are recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. However, evidence of Iraqi involvement in the events of 11th September are non-existent. We plainly cannot use that as a justification for an attack. We are looking therefore at the question of pre- emptive self-defence—the right to strike first to forestall an attack which will happen in the future.
It is questionable whether a right of pre-emptive self-defence exists in international law. Most, but not all, international lawyers believe that it does. But most are also agreed that the right can exist only when an attack is imminent. What "imminent" means is, admittedly, unclear when weapons of mass destruction can be transported in a container on a lorry or a ship, or, indeed, even in a test-tube.

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The most that can be said now is that at some time in the future Saddam may choose to make a weapon of mass destruction available to a terrorist group. We cannot regard that as a sufficiently clear and imminent threat to justify an attack now. On that issue, I beg leave to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Howell, of Guildford.
And so we come back to the third ground for intervention, the failure of Iraq to comply with the United Nations orders to destroy weapons of mass destruction and not to re-equip itself, and, in particular, its non-compliance with resolutions 687 and 1441. I believe that this is a far stronger ground for intervention, and the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, was right to concentrate entirely on it.
The United Nations has power under Article 39 to decide on the measures to take to maintain peace and security; under Article 41 the measures may be sanctions; and under Article 42, if sanctions prove to be inadequate, the United Nations may use armed force.
I have little doubt that Iraq still has biological and chemical weapons; I have little doubt that an Iraq in possession of weapons of mass destruction is, and would become increasingly, a threat to the peace and security of its region, if not of the wider world. I therefore have to accept that the use of armed force would be a proportionate and legitimate response if no other form of pressure can induce Iraq to disclose and destroy its weapons of mass destruction and its facilities for making them.
But the use of armed force would be legitimate only if other methods had failed. The question is, have they failed? Certainly they have not yet succeeded, but it is not clear that they have yet failed. We must not allow a timetable to be dictated by logistics and climate. We must act with deliberate speed and not with haste. Others have discussed, and will discuss, possible alternatives to armed force. I will say, once again, that force must be used only as a last resort.
I turn to the final issue, which is perhaps the most important of all. A decision under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter to use force is a matter that must be decided by the international community, acting through the United Nations. That brings me back to where I started—the rule of law must be paramount.
I recognise that without the commitment of the USA there would be no chance whatever of enforcing compliance by Saddam Hussein with the United Nations resolutions. That gives the USA a right to respect for its views and to a strong voice in the decision-making process. But it must balance its great powers with great restraint. As Shakespeare said in "Measure for Measure",
"O, it is excellent
To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous
"To use it like a giant".
The United States and the United Kingdom should act only with the authority of the international community behind them. Without that authority, military force would not be legitimate. I believe that

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what I have said represents the views not only of most of the British people but of very many Americans as well.

9.3 p.m.
Lord Morgan: My Lords, it is late. As a historian, I want to reflect briefly on the observable and wide gulf between the views of the Government and the views of the British people. Normally in a war crisis, historically government and people converge as they did in 1914 and in 1939. This time, they have grown further and further apart. At the present time, perhaps three-quarters of the British people do not support a war. At least 30 per cent have said that they will not support a war under any circumstances, even with a second UN resolution.
The Government say that the facts need to be explained and the message elucidated and then people will form correct views. Well, the message has been elucidated; the spinners have spun; the plagiarists have plagiarised; and the people are more hostile than ever and public opposition to an attack on Iraq has grown stronger. Why is that? Have our people suddenly turned uniformly into Trotskyists and pacifists? They find the Government's case unconvincing; they simply do not believe it.
In the first place, it is evident that people are not persuaded that Saddam Hussein is an obvious threat to the United Kingdom—perhaps not immediately a threat to anywhere. After all, he was successfully contained by international force for 12 years previous to this crisis. It was only after September 11th—indeed, some time after that—that the United States turned its attention, in a way that future historians will find mysterious and interesting to penetrate, from Al'Qaeda to Iraq, which, after all, had been there all along.
The public recognise that Saddam Hussein is an unpleasant man and that his regime is cruel. They do not regard the case for his having weapons of mass destruction—certainly not nuclear weapons—as currently proven. Saddam Hussein certainly has some unpleasant weapons—of course he has, we gave him some of them; the United States gave him others. The

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United States was responsible for selling Iraq anthrax, West Nile virus and botuliniol toxin in the 1980s, the salesman being Mr Donald Rumsfeld.
In spite of that, the reports by Dr Blix have so far been temperate. Things are by no means satisfactory, but they are moderately encouraging. He talks of positive progress and it is surely reasonable to ask for inspection to be undertaken properly and to reach its appointed time, rather than to resort to the extreme response of war.
Secondly, as many noble Lords have said, people are not convinced of any link between Iraq and international terrorism. The evidence for that is derisory. The people of this country fear that the threat of terrorism will be greatly increased by an attack on Iraq—as may be tension between the different ethnic communities in this country.
Thirdly, people deeply suspect the motives of the United States. That is not just anti-Americanism; our people are not anti-American. I am not anti-American; I taught American history in universities for 30 years and greatly enjoyed it. But there is great hostility to and distrust of an extreme Right-wing administration. People distrust the unilateralism of American foreign and external policy in relation to the environment, armaments, the International Criminal Court and many other issues.
There is mass popular distrust in this country about the American concern with oil and the hypocrisy that is shown in not acting against an aggressive Israeli regime with an extremely Right-wing government who consistently defy the UN's edicts and deny fundamental human rights for Palestinians. There is great disbelief in this country that the United States, rather late in the day, has decided that this is a crusade for human rights. What human rights, when the Kurds, for example, are specifically omitted? Why are they omitted? Because it would upset the Turks and a large number of Kurds live in Turkey, which is a valuable base.
It is also recognised that the United States has for decades propped up and continues to prop up some of the most atrocious regimes in the world, which have flouted human rights—at present, Uzbekistan, which provides virtually no human rights, but is a convenient base. That is recognised and regarded with a good deal of suspicion.
The British people also believe in the United Nations. Admirably, our Prime Minister also believes in the United Nations. People in this country suspect that that the Americans do not—at any rate, to nothing like the same degree. The Commonwealth background of this country makes us attuned to dialogue and international discourse, whereas the history, background and outlook of the United States are different.
People see the United States apparently overruling or ignoring United Nations resolutions and probably not wanting to use the United Nations at all, had it not been admirably pressurised into it by Tony Blair. They see the US regarding the Blix inspection as an irrelevant interlude, as they have already decided on war. They see the Americans trying to impose their

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definition of regime change unilaterally and in complete defiance of the edicts and principles of international law. They see a United States committed to following its own interests, whatever the rest of the world thinks. Speaking historically, I fear that that is the other side of America's so-called isolationism; it is an interventionist consequence of isolationism. It frightens people.
Finally, the British people fear war because they think that it will be barbarous and will lead to the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people—children, old people and others—in Iraq. They think that it will be far worse than the atrocities undoubtedly committed by Saddam Hussein and will result in a humanitarian catastrophe. They feel that war should be the last resort and that we are a long way short of the last resort.
In addition to what I have tried to identify as popular concerns about Iraq, there are some more specialist concerns. Economists are anxious about the long-term damage to the world economy and the prospects for economic recovery, particularly given the high price of oil. As we have heard in the debate, military experts are worried about the absence of clearly defined strategic objectives and ask about the purpose of the projected war. Those who are expert in international analysis fear the probability of extreme instability for many decades throughout the Middle East. I noticed a remarkable statement by the former Prime Minister, Mr John Major, pointing out the difficulties of getting a stable settlement in Iraq, given the deep animosities between Shias and Sunnis, the position of the Kurds and so on. The effect of the war will be to exacerbate the problems, not to cure them.
Others worry about the new gulf emerging between us and our allies and comrades in France and Germany and the effect that it will have on the European ideal. We are being alienated from France and cosying up to the neo-fascist President Berlusconi, with whom this country has little common interest.
As a historian, I worry about the crude use of history, particularly our old friend the 1930s. Time and again we hear that this crisis is the 1930s come again—what nonsense. Saddam is not another Hitler. Where is his Mein Kampf? Where is his dream of universal conquest? George Bush is certainly no Churchill; it would be a calumny on the reputation of that great man to suggest it. It is a facile argument, and it disturbs me that Downing Street produces it, all the more because I taught one or two of them. My efforts were clearly somewhat in vain.
We should anatomise public opinion. The polls show the components of alienated public opinion on the threatened policy. Every element that brought new Labour to power is hostile. Women are strongly hostile, more so than men. At least 70 per cent of women are hostile to war under almost any circumstances. Young people are deeply alienated, as are the trade unions. In Scotland, only 13 per cent of the people would support a war. God help the Labour Party in the elections in May. It will be a bonus for the SNP and perhaps, in my own nation, for Plaid Cymru. All faiths are opposed to

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the war. Today, we heard the bishops speak out with courage and vision. They do not see it as a just war. There is also the powerful opposition of the Pope. All political parties are united, even Conservatives who reject the gung-ho militarism of Iain Duncan Smith.
That opposition was reflected on 15th February in a great and moving protest comparable with any in our history, comparable with the Chartists or the Suffragettes. The extent of that protest shows how the crisis can destabilise our country. Nearer home, it is certainly destabilising the Labour Party. I have been a member of the Labour Party since 1955. I was a member of the Labour League of Youth before Tony Blair was born. It grieves me to see the haemorrhaging of good members from our party. There are masses of them, and friends of mine are leaving the party.
Tony Blair is a brave man who prides himself on being another Churchill. He must be wary of not being another Ramsay MacDonald. This is said to be a listening Government; one that listens to the people. They should listen—not to transatlantic ideologues but to the wisdom, humanity and decency of the British people.

9.56 p.m.
Lord Skidelsky: My Lords, I do not believe that the war against Iraq, when it comes—as I fear it will—will have much to do with weapons of mass destruction. We already have the instruments in place to keep Saddam Hussein and his weapons bottled up in Baghdad indefinitely. Further measures of disarmament can be secured without war.
On paper, the Government agree with that. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have repeatedly said that they seek to disarm Saddam, not to overthrow

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him, and that can be achieved without war if he co-operates. The Government's policy is disarmament, not regime change.
But no one believes that that is President Bush's policy. The US Administration are committed to regime change, come what may. That, barring coup, assassination or the voluntary retirement of Saddam, means war. The Prime Minister, who courageously set out to divert the American drive towards war into the endless complexity of UN procedure, finds himself a passenger in a run-away car without any further influence on the driver.
True enough, a formula has been discovered to paper over the cracks. It might even be enough to avoid a Security Council veto. Saddam has not fully complied with Security Council Resolutions 687 and 1441. He is in material breach of his obligations and must now face the consequences.
Those, I submit, are legal fictions that are designed to cover up the drive to war. Saddam's military capacity has been much reduced since 1991. I do not believe that anyone disputes that. The Government have admitted as much. Their own dossier, Weapons of Mass Destruction, which was published last September and which was certainly not intended to maximise Saddam's contributions to world peace, pointed out that between 1991 and 1998, his nuclear weapons programme was destroyed and, with it, large parts of his chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes. The new generation of inspectors has not found that those programmes have been reconstituted.
One might think that that was a record of success, not failure and of substantial compliance, not substantial breach. However, the Government cannot acknowledge that because it underscores the case for keeping up the pressure and, in fact, possibly producing more pressure for Saddam to deliver. It does not support the case for going to war.
I listened carefully to the Prime Minister's speech yesterday. He said that 50 per cent compliance was not good enough; it had to be 100 per cent. Of course ideally we would like 100 per cent, but where in the world do a government have a 100 per cent success rate in meeting their targets? I daresay this Government would be pleased with 50 per cent.
The only reasonable test of compliance is whether Saddam retains or could quickly develop a capacity in present circumstances to wage aggressive war. I stress "in present circumstances", because the choice has never been between destroying Saddam and leaving him free to do what he wants. There is the middle course represented by the regime of sanctions and coercive inspections. The Prime Minister has said that Saddam has been given 12 years to comply and has not done so. But the fact is that he has been bottled up in Baghdad for 12 years.
I regard this as a killer argument. Saddam has not been good, but he has been kept quiet. His expansionist ambitions have been completely frustrated. Why do we believe that a system that has achieved these results over

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12 years cannot keep him trussed up for another 12 years, or as long as he lives? He is 65, so maybe it will take 12 years.
One could argue that 9/11 has changed everything; now we face a terrorist threat and Saddam might pass on his small supplies of chemicals and bacteria to terrorist groups. But we need to consider carefully what incentive he might have to do so. I do not think that his incentive is strong; it is extremely weak. If small amounts of these substances can do as much damage as is claimed—and I am very sceptical—destroying government laboratories will not do much good. Small-scale private enterprise operating on well-tried principles, located almost anywhere in the world, could produce as much anthrax or nerve gas as demanded by any terrorist group.
If the looming war is not about Iraq's so-called weapons of mass destruction, what is it that drives American policy? That is fundamental to the whole question. I believe it is a desire to reshape the geopolitics of the Middle East, and beyond that, of other areas of the world, backed by the conviction that the United States alone has the power to do so.
This line of argument can be traced through the thinking of a number of neo-conservative hawks associated with the Project for the New American Century, most of whom—I am talking especially of Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, Douglas Feith, Richard Armitage, William Bennett, John Bolton and Richard Perle—occupy key places in the Bush Administration or his entourage. These people were advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein long before the election of George W Bush and before 9/11. Those events gave them the opportunity to carry out their plans.
But Saddam's overthrow was simply to be a first step in a larger programme which amounts to the establishment of long-term American rule in the Middle East, with Israel as its junior partner. I am using my own language, but I know enough history and enough about international relations to be confident of decoding language that has to be kept coded if it is not to sound too alarming.
Traces of this grand design can be found in President Bush's "axis of evil" speech and the new strategic doctrine of premption. But the underlying philosophy is most cogently expressed in Robert Kagan's remarkable book Paradise and Power. In essence, the argument is that a liberal order rests on the foundation of armed might; that the United States is the only power possessed of the will and force to ensure such an order; and that therefore it must be prepared to use its "unipolar moment" to secure the world order it wants. That is coupled with the view that the Europeans are decadent and therefore hopeless as partners in such a project. As Kagan puts it,
"the Americans are from Mars and the Europeans are from Venus";
or, as the title of his book suggests, the paradise in which the Europeans live depends on America's willingness to use force to deter or defeat those who lack the requisite degree of moral maturity. That is the

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choice between peace and war that we face. It is not about how many vials of poison Saddam Hussein has or whether he is in technical breach of UN resolutions.
I describe this neo-conservative project not to belittle it. In some moods, I am quite attracted by it. I admire its daring, and its aims are not ignoble. But, on balance, I find it chilling, mainly because I do not believe that it can be made to work, at least in a democracy. A democracy that embarks on a career of conquest will soon cease to be a democracy. That is the lesson that we have learnt. That is why, in the end, we in old Europe abandoned the old imperialism. And that is why we should pause long and think hard before sanctioning a new imperialism.

10.6 p.m.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, I have been away from your Lordships' House for several weeks but I have endeavoured to keep up to date with what has been happening. I am horrified that we appear to be moving inexorably towards war, despite assurances from members of the Government that war is not inevitable. I do not believe that the present Iraqi regime represents a threat to anyone—not even to the countries closest to it.
Iraq suffered a crushing defeat in the first Gulf War. Since then, there have been punitive sanctions; inspections which were carried out extensively until 1998 have now been resumed; and there have been regular bombing raids by ourselves and the United States. As a result, a country which once had one of the highest living standards in the Arab world is now at a third-world level.
The idea that this battered country offers any threat to ourselves or the United States is, in my view, simply absurd. Indeed, the Americans seem to recognise that themselves—hence the rather desperate attempt to link the regime with Al'Qaeda. There is of course no evidence for that, as our own Government have said on more than one occasion. The notion of a pre-emptive strike against a country that does not threaten us or anyone else, whatever the past history may be, is quite unacceptable. It is a cover for aggression and a breach of the United Nations charter.
The Government have been applauded for having, it is said, persuaded the United States to go the UN route. But it is clear that the United States Government are interested in that route only if the UN agrees with the US view and gives authority for military action. The same applies to the inspectors—there is so much anxiety about identifying a "smoking gun". There was palpable disappointment when, in their last report, the inspectors did not come up with this. Indeed, they stated categorically that there was no evidence of a nuclear programme. What? No weapons of mass destruction? They must be hidden somewhere. So there must be biological or chemical weapons.
The Iraqis claim that what they once had was destroyed, and they have offered the names of about 80 people who can attest to that. A previous inspector has said that the material that the Iraqis once had

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would now be so degraded as to be no longer useable, even if it exists. But, in any event, why not let the inspectors do their job and, if we have contrary information based on intelligence, why do we not supply it to the inspectors and let them check it out? But no, President Bush's patience is running out, so decisions have to be made.
Obviously the United States Administration would prefer a UN cloak of respectability. That is necessary to silence criticism at home, let alone in this country and throughout Europe. But it is clear that the US will go to war, with us tagging along behind, whether or not UN authorisation is obtained. The war programme is based on hostilities commencing around the middle of March. Later, the climatic conditions may not be so favourable.
I do not believe that a moral case can be made for this war. It will involve the deaths and injuries of many civilians. It is likely to commence with a massive aerial attack, and that is always destructive of civilian lives and civilian infrastructure. Water supplies are disrupted and poisoned, occasioning more deaths. Hospitals are unable to work because of the destruction of power supplies. Food supplies are disrupted—in particular the Oil for Food scheme, which enables some poorer people at least to exist, is likely to be destroyed. The people not killed in the bombing will starve.
Millions will be made homeless, and jobless, as the factories, homes and workplaces are destroyed. Modern warfare requires that civilian morale is totally and brutally crushed. It is a truly terrifying prospect for a civilian population.
We are told that there is a moral case for war, and that Saddam Hussein is so awful a ruler that he is killing his own people through his interpretation of the sanctions imposed by ourselves and others. Of course, Saddam Hussein's worst crimes were committed when he was an ally of ourselves and the United States—so nothing much was said about Halabja at the time.
I find the argument about sanctions astonishing. They are administered by a UN sanctions committee, as regards which we, and the US, have a substantial input. Radiotherapy equipment, chemotherapy drugs and analgesics are consistently blocked by the United States and ourselves, on the grounds that they could be converted into chemical and other weapons. Therefore Iraqi children are denied pain-killing medicines through our actions, rather than those of the Iraqi rulers.
Meanwhile, we and the US are constantly bombing Iraq on the pretext of protecting the no-fly zones. These are clearly attempts to degrade Iraqi installations in advance of war. There is no UN authority for these bombing raids. This was recently made clear by a UN spokesperson. Basra has been bombed repeatedly—as has northern Iraq—and there have been civilian casualties. They are acts of war, and as such totally breach the UN charter.
However, the powerful can get away with it, and that is also the problem with the United Nations route. Many people have said that they would reluctantly support military action if there were UN authorisation. However, it is clear that a lot of arm-twisting is going on

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behind the scenes to try to gain support for the US position. Countries facing economic problems have been offered loans or aid—or else there are threats that aid would be withdrawn. In domestic politics the purchase of votes is regarded as unacceptable. Why is it countenanced in international affairs, when issues of life and death are involved?
The world population has a right to be sure that the decisions taken on its behalf are on the merits of the issues themselves—rather than as a result of backstage bullying and bribery. It now seems that France, Germany and Russia have produced a plan offering an alternative to war. This involves more inspectors, more monitoring and a longer timescale and so forth. It is surely worthy of consideration, particularly in view of the widespread concern that exists in this country and throughout Europe. The Motion drafted by ourselves and the United States is intended as a trigger for war, despite its anodyne wording.
The Government have not convinced the British public that there is a case for war. Myself and others question whether it is about disarmament of Saddam Hussein at all. I was very interested in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky. I believe that there is an agenda to which the Republican advisers around President Bush subscribe, and which they made known before he was elected. They believe that if the United States dominates Iraq, it will be able to reshape the Middle East. They believe they would be stabilising one of the world's most important oil producing regions. They think that they would eventually produce a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on terms which are likely to be much more welcome to Ariel Sharon than to the Palestinians.
Most people would not want to go to war for such a strategy—so we have the farce of the dossiers about a threat, in which many people simply do not believe. Those of us who oppose war are often derided as appeasers—or else are told that we are anti-American. I know that there are many Americans who share our feelings against war. It takes some time for them to get organised and to make their views known. But they will do so and they are already being joined by a number of prominent United States citizens.
As to the charge of appeasement, that makes me very angry. I am old enough to remember the Second World War. I know what it is like to huddle in an air-raid shelter and hear the scream of the bombs as they come down—and to see people, or what remains of them, dug out of the wreckage of their homes. The generation who challenged Hitler's regime—and Saddam Hussein is no Hitler—knew very well what had to be faced. Today's armchair worriers face no such threat. They will watch the war on television while others pay the price.
In my experience, those who have first-hand knowledge of war are often those most opposed to it and critical of those who want to start another one. That was certainly true of my late husband, a former RAF pilot with a string of medals for bravery earned during the Second World War. I remember how we watched the first Gulf War on television and saw the

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bombing of Baghdad. I remember how he said to me, "Smart bombs, smart bombs. Don't you believe it. We are watching people being killed down there". And of course so we were.
My Lords, we must not let it happen again.

10.18 p.m.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, I support noble Lords who today have opposed what is clearly the inexorable drive to war. I do so not because I am a pacifist; I am not. Indeed, I supported the campaign to regain the Falklands when at least one member of the present Government marched in favour of bringing troops home and ceding sovereignty to a fascist dictator. It would be interesting to know how many members of the Government were against our retaking the Falklands—perhaps we ought to send them a questionnaire to discover exactly what their attitude was.
I also supported the Gulf War in 1991 to eject Iraq from Kuwait, because I do not believe in dictators, or anyone else, invading other people's countries and removing their sovereignty. Again, it would be interesting to know how many members of the present administration were opposed to that war and to taking back Kuwait from Saddam Hussein.
I was also in favour of pursuing Saddam, taking over Baghdad and removing the regime at that time. We failed to do so. I urged that we should. If we had, we would not be having this debate. So we missed the opportunity to get rid of that awful man about whom everyone is talking. We did not do it then and there is
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no reason why we should do it now, because, as many other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, have said, he is contained and cannot get out of his box.
The Prime Minister's Statement yesterday referred to 4 million refugees. But of course, many of those refugees are Shia Muslims, who were encouraged by the first Bush Administration to rise up against the Iraqi regime. When they did so, they were abandoned by Mr Bush I. Many of them were killed and many of them went into exile. That is one reason why we have so many refugees.
As many noble Lords have said, the West was also complicit in the use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. Indeed, they supplied them and were aware that they were being used, but did nothing. That suited them at the time because the policy was to contain Iran. So the policy then pursued by Saddam was agreed by the West.
What has concerned me during the past four or five months has been the implausible and chameleon-like case for immediate war against Iraq. First, the case was the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Then it was that Iraq posed a military threat to the United States and Europe, which of course it does not. It is absurd to suggest that Saddam does; he has neither the weapons nor the means to deliver them. That was always absurd. Then it was because he had links with Osama bin Laden, which the CIA itself denied. Then there was regime change, followed, of course, by the moral duty to free the people of Iraq from Saddam's tyranny. But yesterday, the Prime Minister's Statement returned to ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam could remain in power—presumably to continue to tyrannise his own people.
It is that incoherent message that has confused so many people and led them to suspect the real motives of the United States and, to some degree, of the United Kingdom. Speculation about the real agenda ranges from grabbing Iraq's oil to taking over the whole of the Middle East for their own purposes.
What I have found reprehensible about the stance taken by the United States and the United Kingdom is that their policy has been underpinned not only by a threat of massive military action against Iraq—a country of 20 million poor people, not Hitler's Germany—but by a threat to the future of the United Nations. The threat is that if the United Nations does not bow to their wishes, it will be undermined. If it does not come to heel, the United States will undermine its position in the world. That is not only unacceptable but dangerous for world peace and order.
What has not yet been properly tried is real diplomacy. We used to have diplomacy before war, but it has not been tried. Mr Blair has been all over the world to solicit support for belligerence. Why has not he or any other British Minister visited Iraq to attempt to negotiate? The same goes for the United States. The United Nations arms inspectors are just that; they are not negotiators and should not be seen as such.

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War should always be the last resort for democracies. As Churchill said so well:
"To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war".
Diplomacy should not consist simply of threats. It should offer carrots as well as sticks, in return for co-operation and reformation, rather than humiliating a country and its leaders. Why cannot we offer Iraq a deal that would gradually end sanctions and no-fly zones in return for full co-operation on weapons of mass destruction? There has already been movement on that and moves to end military rule and establish a democratic system.
No doubt I shall be accused of being naive, but, before we embark on military action that is likely to kill thousands of innocent civilians and is bound to destabilise the Middle East further and put the United Kingdom and its citizens at heightened risk of terrorist attack, we should seriously try the diplomatic route. True, that will take months of patient negotiation, but is not that what democracy is about and what makes democracy superior to dictatorship and tyranny?

10.37 p.m.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, this is probably the first time in history that a world crisis has unfolded in real time in our sitting-rooms. Twist by twist and turn by turn, everyone has been able to follow the complex and intractable Iraqi tragedy. The deep public engagement puts, I suggest, unique strains on political leadership.
I am proud of the reaction of the British public. I am proud of their maturity and balance, and of that remarkable demonstration on 15th February which shattered the notion that we have become a frivolous nation, disengaged from serious politics. It is also fair to say that, like others, I have been impressed by the role and intent of the Prime Minister, although I disagree with aspects of his strategy now. We all wish him and his Ministers wisdom and stamina in the months ahead.
Before turning to the single issue that I want to deal with at this late hour, perhaps I may say a word about the legality and status of the different UN resolutions. The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, fairly and accurately referred to the differences between the Iraq resolutions—Resolutions 687 and 1441—and the Israeli occupied territory resolutions, Resolutions 242 and 338. My noble friend Lord Goodhart gave a very able analysis of the legalities and the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, made some apposite remarks. But there is a danger. On the one hand we are insistent—at least on this side of the House and I think on all sides

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of the House—that everything that we do now is in accord with international law, for itself and also for the preservation and strengthening of the United Nations; but it is a strange lawyer who will advise his client that merely because the law is on his side he should use the rights that it bestows. The trick is in the political judgment as to whether to utilise resolutions that may at this moment allow intervention.
I return to the issue that the Prime Minister so acutely and correctly identified shortly after September 11th when he said that the battle in respect of international terrorism is one of hearts and minds. He seems to some extent to have forgotten that, yet it colours every prospect and every consequence, every hope and every fear.
I do not think I need spend much time convincing your Lordships that Britain has an ambiguous enough history and relationship with the Middle East and that that of the USA is more contentious still. Unfortunately, in the Muslim world, few believe that a President backed by the US oil industry has no designs on Iraqi oil or that the influence of the likes of Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Perle at the heart of his Administration, to say nothing of the fiercely pro-Israeli lobby, is unrelated to what they see as double standards applied by the United States towards Israel vis-a-vis the Palestinians as compared with Iraq.
I, too, welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Turner of Camden, back in her place. She said all that I would have wished to say and more on the human and moral concerns that are at the forefront of Anglo-American justification for war. However, people in the Middle East have long memories when it comes to their attitude to the Americans and to us. They do not forget that one of the two invasions that are now used by us as justification for invading Iraq—namely, the invasion of Iran in 1980—was undertaken by Saddam with the support of the United States, ourselves and France and that we supplied him with all his arms in that eight-year war, during which over 1 million Iranians were killed or seriously wounded. Mr. Cheney himself authorised the supply of weapons of mass destruction to Saddam which he then used with devastating and horrific effects against the Iranians. The Muslims do not forget the double standards—the hypocrisy as they see it—which this represents.
I listened avidly to what the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, said about the other political background. It is no surprise that America in particular is seen by many decent Muslims as ignorant, if not contemptuous, of their way of life and the values of traditional Islam. It is characterised in the eyes of many by its righteous aggressiveness and capitalist fundamentalism, and I say this as a staunch friend of America.
In his speech yesterday, Mr Blair talked of our looking foolish if we were to delay war much longer and of our loss of potential authority and credibility. I urge him to concentrate on the issue of hearts and minds. If our invasion of Iraq is generally perceived as unjust here, will it be fair to commit our soldiers to it, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, asked?

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Above all, if the American and British Governments have not convinced a clear majority of their own citizens of the justness and wisdom of war, how on earth do we think we are anywhere near convincing those in the Middle East of its justness and wisdom?
If war is perceived as unjust in the Middle East, as I believe it is, no ease of military victory will compensate for the aftermath, particularly if massive Iraqi casualties are paralleled by only a handful of our own. If the overwhelming might of our means of war is felt to be unjust as well as the ends, the bad blood—indeed, hatred—which could be vented would convert military victory into political disaster. We would have won a truly Pyrrhic triumph. Instead of being rooted out, terrorism would be sown like dragon's teeth around the Muslim world. Then we could, and I think would, reap a savage harvest.
What will President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have to say to us if, in the year following "victory", there is launched against the cities of the West a series of devastating suicide attacks which we know would be virtually unstoppable? What if the position in Palestine goes from disastrous to worse, with the level of conflict and killing escalating exponentially and in the process energising further hatred and violence? All that would be grist to the mill of Al'Qaeda and provoke other nascent terrorist groups, accelerate the prospect of unintended regime change in other Middle Eastern states, and risk regional chaos with who knows what world economic circumstances, to which my noble friend Lord Newby has referred.
Of course there is no guarantee that holding back unless and until there is an unequivocal second United Nations resolution for invasion will avoid those prospects. But to my mind what is unanswerable is that the "soft war"—the war of allegiance—is infinitely more important and difficult to win, and can only be done by consensus and restraint up to and if necessary beyond the 11th hour.
It is against that assessment that I am convinced that only an invasion fully endorsed by the United Nations, as was the case with Kuwait, can avoid these malign and self-defeating outcomes.

10.46 p.m.
Baroness Massey of Darwen: My Lords, I have never been the 49th speaker anywhere before, and as such I shall be remarkably brief. In any case, so much has already been said most eloquently. I do not usually speak in debates on international affairs although I have been involved in and worked in international development programmes. Perhaps that is why I feel so passionately about many issues related to dealings with Iraq; why I speak with a deep anxiety about the processes in which we are now engaged; and why I feel that debate must continue and indeed be encouraged.
I preface my remarks by stating that I, like others, have great regard for the energy and leadership of the Prime Minister. He has undoubtedly exerted a restraining influence on the United States over many months. I accept that Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator with a violent history. I know that after
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September 11th there was justifiably a deep sense of outrage in the United States and many parts of the world. The terrorist issue is very real. However, is Iraq the legitimate focus or a scapegoat? I want to summarise my concerns at the beginning and then illustrate them with material drawn from American sources.
I believe that we should not act without United Nations consensus. However difficult international negotiation may be, it is the only mechanism we have for avoiding war, even if those negotiations need to be long and tortuous. The consequences and aftermath of war in Iraq in humanitarian terms have not, for me, been sufficiently and convincingly detailed, although they have been mentioned many times tonight. The consequences of military action may increase, not diffuse tension and terrorism in the Middle East and the rest of the world.
I am deeply concerned about the impact of military action on the domestic economies of both the United States and Britain. What would be the benefits of such a war to the US? Do we know, honestly and realistically? What would be the benefits to Britain, and what would be the negative impacts? Has such an analysis been done? I am deeply concerned about Britain being seen to be irrevocably attached to an American regime which has a poor record in support of issues that I believe are important: reproductive rights, the environment, children's rights and poverty. It also has a poor record of humanitarian support for nations following military action, such as in Afghanistan. As that has already been mentioned, I will not go into it.
I am not anti-American. I have lived and worked in the US and admire its founding principles of justice and human rights and its get up and go-ism. However, I have serious misgivings about its sometimes simplistic approaches to complex problems, its materialism and self-interest. My noble friend Lord Morgan expressed it better than I can.
Perhaps I may now illustrate my concerns by examples from an article in the New York Times last week and from a declaration opposing war with Iraq signed by over 60 towns in the United States. The New York Times article suggests that the American Administration have,
"turned the regular foreign aid budget into a tool of war diplomacy".
Small countries who have seats on the UN Security Council have suddenly received aid. Is this an attempt to influence votes? Is this a "coalition of the willing" spoken of by President Bush or a "coalition of the bought off" asks the author. What about the promises to Afghanistan to help rebuild when the 2004 budget ignored aid and had hastily to add it later? At least one senior American administrator has said that Iraq must pay for its own reconstruction.
Some talk of Iraqi oil being the spoils of war. What would happen, as others have asked, to Iraqi Kurdistan? Would Turkey be allowed to occupy the territory? Would Saddam be replaced by American governance, but many of his officials remain in post? Would the Sunni

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minority rule the Shi'ite majority? Those questions are posed in an American newspaper. They are terrifying in their implications. I see no adequate responses.
A recent declaration by American towns opposing war makes the following points. I summarise and edit. This is from a copy sent to me by a friend in a town in Illinois. First, issues between Iraq and the world community have not proved to be unresolvable by traditional diplomatic efforts. Secondly, sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN at the urging of the US Government have resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of non-combatants, an overwhelming number of them under the age of five. Thirdly, in a war the lives of American soldiers and Iraqi civilians would be in jeopardy. I add a note that around 50 per cent of the Iraqi population is under the age of 15. Fourthly, the cost estimate to the US for a war with Iraq is between 9 billion dollars and 18 billion dollars a month—80 per cent of the school districts in Illinois face budget crises. Fifthly, the billions of dollars spent on war could be better spent on schools, nutrition, healthcare, housing and eliminating poverty in the United States. Sixthly, the US is urged in this declaration to work through the UN, disarm Iraq, and reaffirm its commitment to the rule of law in international relationships.
Again, these are Americans raising concerns. We all know that many people in the UK share similar concerns for similar reasons. I believe that we have a duty to support the concept and principles of the United Nations. I believe that the full consequences of war with Iraq have not been thoroughly explored: the aftermath remains uncertain. Just getting rid of Saddam and his weapons is not enough for me and I would not wish to see Britain launched on military commitments with the US under these circumstances. I hope that the Government will think very carefully about their alliances and the terrible complexities of their undertakings.

10.54 p.m.
Lord Greaves: My Lords, I start by stating where I stand. I took part in the march on 15th February, along with at least 15 of my noble friends. I was proud to be led by my noble friend Lady Williams and by Charles Kennedy. I am also proud that 52 of my colleagues in another place turned out, with the exception of Menzies Campbell who is away sick, to vote against the Government today. I stand firm with my party on this issue but, having said that, I want to pick up a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, and mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Chan. I refer to the effect of current developments on Muslim communities in this country.
The noble Baroness referred to the demonising of Muslims and said that people feel able to make forced entries into mosques willy-nilly. An excellent report published last August by the Minority Rights Group International, Muslims in Britain, refers to
"long-standing marginalization and the worrying rise in open hostility against Muslims".

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My experience of the 1.5 million Muslims in this country is largely based on communities in Lancashire consisting of people of Pakistani and Indian origin. My friends in those communities have an increasing sense that they are under siege and suffer a growing lack of confidence in their future in this country.
A few weeks ago, The Times surveyed children in a primary school playground in Surrey, asking them to suggest terms with which they associated the word "Muslim". Forty per cent of the children equated "Muslim" with "terrorist". In the British media, terms such as "terrorist", "Muslim" "asylum seeker", "crime" and "disease" go round and round in any order, with disgraceful exploitation of individual cases—some of which are unfounded. It is therefore not surprising that many British-born Muslims ask, as one did of me this morning, "What the hell are we doing here?"
Muslim communities are increasingly retreating into their own media. In almost all the Asian households in Nelson in Lancashire, the main TV channel is PTV—Pakistan Television. That reflects a typical retreat from British society to something with which Muslims feel much safer. That relatively recent trend has come with the development of cable and satellite TV.
There is much perceived petty racism, such as spitting at women in headscarves. If someone spat at one of your Lordships or myself, we would regard it as rudeness. If one is used to being on the receiving end of petty racism, one assumes that it is racist. Young people perceive that they are being harassed by the police.
More importantly, I am told by people whose information and views I respect that ordinary individuals are moving money out of the UK to safety pots, as they are called, in other countries. That was common in the 1970s, when immigrants would bank surplus money in Pakistan, commenting, "We do not know how long we'll be here. We don't know when they'll kick us out". That practice is starting up again. At weddings, funerals and other family gatherings, the gossip usually gets around to, "Where are you putting your money now? Switzerland, Canada or Dubai?"
Economically more important is the growing belief since September 11th that there has been a dramatic increase in the targeting of Muslim businesses in this country by the security services and fraud investigators in a way that does not apply to other ethnic minorities or communities. I have been provided with details of a number of instances in which it appears that that is taking place. People are finding that they are unable to get banking facilities any longer in this country, or that their businesses are raided and their computers and records taken away, only to be brought back a week later with no charges laid. When the businesses are in financial services or trading, that is very serious as those records may be used for all sorts of purposes, and the people concerned have no idea that it is happening.
I have no idea whether that is taking place on a discriminatory basis, because all the evidence that I have been provided with is anecdotal, and I do not

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know how to find out. I have tabled Written Questions, but the Government say that they do not keep records about that kind of thing on an ethnic basis. That is probably right. Whether it is right or wrong, the fact is that there is a perception that it is happening. People are moving large sums of money out of this country and into places such as Dubai where they believe that their funds and businesses will be safe.
At a different level, one of the advantages of the Government's rather incompetently organised asylum seekers' dispersal programme is that, in an area such as mine, the ethnic composition of the population has been greatly enriched, at least temporarily. We have lots of asylum seekers, including Kurds and Arabs of various sorts from Iraq. There are concerns that the Government intend, if there is a war—perhaps I should say "when the war on Iraq starts"—that there will be a general rounding-up of Iraqis. The concern is that it will be used as an excuse to round up, intern or detain people, including large numbers of people who have come here to escape the tyranny of the brutal Saddam Hussein regime.
Of course, that happened during the Second World War when many Jews who came here for safe haven found themselves interned for the duration. It would be a disgrace if that were to happen again. I should like to ask the Minister specifically for an assurance that that is not planned. If it is planned, what powers are intended to be used? Who will be responsible for choosing the people to be interned? I hope that she will be able to answer that.
I support most of what has been said by many noble Lords, particularly those on these Benches, and I look forward to the remainder of the debate.

11.13 p.m.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, this has been a sober debate on a vital subject. In a powerful speech to the American Senate 10 days ago, the Democratic Senator for West Virginia, Robert Byrd, said:
"This coming battle, if it materialises, represents a turning point in US foreign policy".
It will also represent a turning point in British foreign policy. We must therefore give it very serious attention, as all noble Lords have done. The balance of the debate in this Chamber has reflected the balance of debate in the country that the overwhelming majority are not yet convinced of the case that the Government put forward.
During the early stages of this debate, I felt that the unusual emptiness of the Government Benches spoke strongly of the hesitation of the Government's party on this matter. It is the first occasion on which I have noticed that the Cross Benches are markedly fuller than the Labour Benches.
We have heard a number of extremely helpful speeches and powerful critical speeches from behind the Government Front Bench, particularly from the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, who answered the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, about the relevance or irrelevance of international law. I was glad to hear from those on my own Benches a number of speeches on the many different dimensions of this complex issue.
The Government's rationale, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, in her opening speech seemed to present the American position more than the British. To summarise, it states that Iraq is an immediate threat to world order. She made only a passing reference to the Arab-Israel conflict and, unless I misheard her, no reference to the terrorist threat or to the implications for the Middle East region as a whole or the rest of the Muslim world in south and south-east Asia; nor, as the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, and my noble friend Lord Greaves remarked, for Europe and our own country.
The concerns in the debate have been widely repeated on all sides of the House: concerns that the war on Iraq will spark increased terrorism, not lessen it; that the implications for the region as a whole have not been addressed; that we hear absurd ideas floating around Washington and Tel-Aviv on how a simple intervention in Iraq would bring peace to the entire region and that, to quote Henry Kissinger, the road to Jerusalem lies through Baghdad; that the management of Iraq post-conflict has not yet been set out in any way that commands confidence; and that the potential damage to world order, to the United Nations and to other institutions and to the structure of international law itself may be considerable.
We all accept the appalling nature of the Saddam regime. Iraq and its neighbours would benefit if he were to be removed. But we cannot treat this question in

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isolation without considering why the Bush Administration are pursuing it now and the wider context and implications. As I listened to some of the opening speeches, Thomas à Becket's speech in Murder in the Cathedral suddenly came to me, where he talks about the courses he has to take and says:

"The last temptation is the greatest treason:

To do the right thing for the wrong reason".
We have to consider the Bush Administration's reasons and our Government's reasons, which follow the Bush Administration, for attacking Saddam. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, accused those who criticised the Bush Administration of being anti-American and anti-Semitic. That is the argument used by right-wing Americans to silence criticism. I would like to quote from a number of American sources, as the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky did.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I did not accuse anyone of anything. I said that there was a degree of anti-Americanism in the debate, which there was.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, the noble Lord also referred to anti-Semitism. There may be a certain amount of it, but many noble Lords who are neither anti-Semitic nor anti-American have justifiable criticisms to make.
The noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, remarked on the neo-conservatives in the United States and their power in the Bush Administration. At the weekend I pulled out Bob Woodward's book, Bush at War. He remarks that three days after September 11th, the briefing to the President was given by the Deputy Defense Secretary—the noble Lord, Lord Desai, will note that it is not just people in think tanks—Paul Wolfowitz, whom I have known personally for nearly 40 years. It says that he,
"often voiced the views of an outspoken group of national security conservatives in Washington . . . These were men who believed that there was no greater menace in the world than Iraqi President Saddam Hussein".
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is quoted as saying:
"In his analysis, the only justification for going after Iraq would be clear evidence linking the Iraqis to the September 11 attacks. Short of that, targeting Iraq was not worth the risk of angering moderate Arab states whose support was crucial not only to any campaign in Afghanistan, but to reviving the Middle East peace process".

Colin Powell is quoted as saying to him on the aside:

"What the hell, what are these guys thinking about? Can't you get these guys back in the box?"

Those are Americans in the Administration criticising the push, which was there among the neo-conservatives well before September 11th, for taking Saddam out. I agree strongly with what the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, said about the determination to use the unipolar moment to establish what they call a "democratic imperialism" across the world. At Davos on 26th January, Colin Powell said to his audience:
"I believe that the United States has earned the trust of men, women and children around the world".

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That is currently the pitch: you do not need the UN; you can trust the United States, and you can trust the Bush Administration.
Robert Kagan, in the opening paragraph of the book which the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, quoted, starts by saying:
"It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world".

So much for the Prime Minister's appeal to our "shared values", which make Britain a natural bridge, as he argues, between Europe and the United States. Tom Friedman, one of the best, and rather conservative, commentators in the American press, said in the New York Times on 20th February:

"The Bush folks are big on attitude, weak on strategy, and terrible on diplomacy".
We have heard many comparisons in this debate about Munich. I believe that it is important also to remember Suez and Vietnam. I was studying and teaching in the United States in the early years of the Vietnam war and I remember very well the twisting of intelligence information by the political masters of intelligence and the denigration of the experts on the region. I was at Cornell University, which had an Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. It was vigorously attacked by the State Department and in Congress with threats of withdrawal of funds. There was over-confidence in the ability to resolve the problem through military force, a refusal to pay any attention to the different culture and assumptions of the opponent, and, indeed, denigration of the enemy as such.
Now, I am afraid to say, we have a similar mood within the United States. There have been some bitter attacks on the Middle East studies community, including calls for federal funding for all university institutes on Middle East studies in the United States to be withdrawn. Tom Friedman, whom I quote again, said:

"Every time I hear [the Bush Administration try to justify war on the grounds that Saddam is allied with Osama bin Laden], I think of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. You don't take the country to war on the wings of a lie".

As I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, say that there was amazing evidence that terrorists were closely linked to Saddam Hussein and that, indeed, since September 11th Iraq was at the heart of a new network of international terrorism, I have to say that I was not sure where he got that from.
I quote again Senator Byrd's powerful speech, which, sadly, received almost no attention in the American media. He complains:
"There is no debate",

within the United States,

"no discussion, no attempt to lay out for the nation the pros and cons of this particular war . . . The doctrine of pre-emption .. appears to be in contravention of international law and the UN charter . . . This reckless and arrogant administration has initiated policies which may reap disastrous consequences . . . to turn one's frustration and anger into the kind of destabilising foreign policy debacle that the world is currently witnessing is inexcusable".
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That is not an anti-American diatribe from a European; it is from a member of the US Senate.
Many other speakers have referred to the radical character of this Administration and to the fundamentalist groups which have gained so much influence over it. Political fundamentalism, as the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, pointed out, means tax cuts, which are intended to force the dismantling of the welfare state, and cuts in funding for education, which are clearly and explicitly a radical departure from the Rooseveltian values which we all share and are intended to complete what the Reagan administration hesitated to carry through. There is also economic fundamentalism, which says that deficits do not matter, and religious fundamentalism, which includes support for Israel to occupy all the historic land, including further expansion of settlements and the expulsion of Palestinians. The capture of American Middle East policy by Likud is one of the most worrying dimensions of this. I quote again from the international edition of the New York Times of 25th February. The Israeli defence Minister said hopefully:
"'We have great interest in shaping the Middle East the day after a war".

The article continued:

"Israel regards Iran and Syria as greater threats and hopes that once Saddam is dispensed with, the dominoes will start to tumble".

Later in the article, a senior Israeli official is reported as hoping that,

"after the war would come a fork in the road for American policy",

in which the Americans would choose Israel rather than Europe. It went on to say that,

"the Quartet may itself prove a casualty of an Iraqi war . . . there are people in Washington who are going to say 'What do we need these people for?'"
By "these people", he meant the Europeans. The Israelis hope that the Quartet will die the death quietly during the course of the war.
There are circumstances in which it may be justifiable to intervene in Iraq and to remove Saddam Hussein from power. However, that has to be through the meticulous and careful use of UN procedures. It should also be with the understanding and, if possible, the support of other states in the region. This is not a strong basis for Britain and the United States alone to decide whether Iraq has met its objectives. We need to carry others with us.
There are some circumstances in which British forces should not follow American forces into Iraq alone—not without broader support from the international community, and not without parallel progress on the Arab/Israel conflict, which includes the publication of the road-map, which has been blocked by the Sharon government. There are now bilateral negotiations between the Israelis and the United States about the parts that the Israelis want changed. It seems to me to be a sine qua non of British involvement that the road-map is published beforehand and not left until afterwards.
We need a strategy towards terrorism. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thomson of Monifieth, that we need also to be tough on the causes of terrorism. The
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most depressing thing about President Bush's Jacksonville speech was the extent to which he entirely merged intervention in Iraq with the war on terrorism. It was as if defeating Iraq would solve the terrorist problem. We all know that is not the case.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. He was asking where all the evidence about Iraq's links with terrorism came from. The answer is that there is a very wide range of sources, mostly coming from Washington and from senior members of the Administration. However, if he does not want to look at those, he needs only to consult the excellent speech made by his noble friend Lady Nicholson. She gave ample evidence of Iraq's habit of being involved in terrorism.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, I listened carefully to the speech of my noble friend Lady Nicholson. She referred to the use of MKO in Iraq and Iran. It was not the sort of world-wide network of which I understood the noble Lord to be talking.
We need a multilateral approach to energy supplies and conservation. One of the many disturbing things about the current debate in Washington is that in the State of the Union message President Bush spoke only about the use of hydrogen-powered vehicles at some time within the next 10 to 15 years as resolving the problem of energy dependence in the United States. We need to have the US coming back into multilateral discussions about energy dependence. We also want the Government to pursue the re-establishment of some consensus among European governments. We want to see a government who will ensure that the United Nations and international institutions come out of this stronger and not weaker.
Why is there a rush to war now? Why is there an assumption that the United Kingdom will, together with the United States, intervene in Iraq, even if no other significant government, except Australia, accompany them? The Prime Minister, in his Glasgow speech on 15th February justifying intervention, talked about the,
"threat of chaos, disorder, and instability",

if we do not go in. The threat of chaos, disorder and instability if we do go in without a clear sense of why we are going and what we are going to do after the war is serious. The absence of any coherent strategy for post-conflict Iraq or the Middle East as a whole is one of the underlying weaknesses. We are not yet convinced. The Government have not yet made a reasonable case. British troops should not be sent into action on such a thin basis of policy with such unclear objectives and with so large a proportion of the British public doubtful of the whole enterprise.